The rise of evidence based public health in the European Union. by Marnoch, Gordon
	   1	  
 
The	  rise	  of	  evidence	  based	  public	  health	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  	  
PSA	  Conference	  	  
Brighton	  21-­‐23	  March	  2016	  
	  
Dr.	  Gordon	  Marnoch,	  School	  of	  Criminology,	  Politics	  &	  Social	  Policy,	  Ulster	  University,	  
Jordanstown,	  County	  Antrim	  Northern	  Ireland,	  BT37	  0QB.	  
Email:	  gj.marnoch@ulster.ac.uk	  	  
Abstract  
 
Evidence-based medicine is most readily adopted when it can be applied to pharmaceutical or other 
clinical interventions for common diseases found in well-defined populations of patients. Public health 
policy on the other hand, is frequently formed in contentious, time-constrained circumstances where 
decisions are reached before the health problem and the population at risk are adequately defined. 
Policy may also emerge on the basis of an incomplete search for evidence and a limited assessment of 
the quality of research. Conducting trials of public health interventions is not usually possible in 
emerging disease situations such as a pandemic, where initially there are very small numbers of cases, 
speed of policy response appears critical and creating control groups for alternative interventions raises 
political problems. In respect of a problem such as illicit drug use, legal and ethical issues, populist 
politics and public opinion create significant barriers for evidence influenced public health policy. The 
paper examines the promotion of evidence based public health policies by the EU, using pandemic 
vaccination and responses to illicit drug use as cases.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
In examining the ‘reach of Europeanization’, the paper focuses on the role of the EU 
in promoting evidence based public health policies. This is an of potential ‘added-
value’, which is a concept that is used to justify much EU policy action (Azzopardi-
Muscat 2015) The paper examines two very different areas of health policy –
pandemic response (with particular reference to the H1N1 episode in 2009) and 
responses to illicit drug misuse. One of the most obvious areas of value for EU health 
action is communicable disease and other cross-border threats to health.  A border 
free Europe makes it easier for infectious diseases to spread yet it is widely accepted 
that EU action has been modest in its impact in dealing with this problem. This is in 
spite of the apparently strong evidence base that exists to support public health 
policy in this particular area. The reasoning behind using the EU as a driver for 
coordinated evidence-based policy action in respect of drug trafficking is equally 
compelling, but the related case of illicit drug misuse is rather more fragile, with 
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evidence also being of a different quality to that related to communicable diseases 
and pandemic in particular.  
 
The intention is to examine the record and future potential of existing EU institutions 
in encouraging an evidence-based approach to health policy on the part of member 
states. Both illicit drugs and pandemic vaccination are mentioned in the key points 
summary of the EU health policy set out in Together for Health (Commission of the 
European Communities 2008). A separate European Drugs strategy was endorsed 
by the Justice and Home Affairs Council of the European Union during 2012-13 
(ECMDDA 2016) The new 2013–20 strategy now incorporates the ‘reduction of the 
health and social risks and harms caused by drugs’ as a policy objective, alongside 
the better established drug policy aims of reducing supply and demand. The new 
strategy stresses the need for an empirical and evidence-based approach to drugs 
policy. 
 
The analysis follows a basic premise that institutions and the use of evidence in 
policy are inextricably linked. In choosing policy areas where the use of evidence is 
affected by markedly different sets of problems and opportunities, the intention is to 
expose the strengths and weaknesses of the institutions of the EU with respect to 
promoting or enforcing evidence based policies.  
 
The principle of subsidiarity is extremely important in the EU’s historical relationship 
to health policy. While member states still have responsibility for the organization and 
delivery of health services and health care, Article 152 in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, 
was seen as a key moment in signaling the EU’s intentions to pursue a stronger role 
in public health policy. (Hunter pp.152-153) Health was increasingly defined as 
something broader than the prevention of disease, which had previously been the 
focus of the EU’s policy. A period of institution building has followed during which DG 
SANCO (see below) was created in 1999 and began to establish itself as a dedicated 
health directorate. In September 2002 the European Parliament and the Council of 
Ministers adopted the DG SANCO’s public health program.  This reflected the 
broader view of public health now adopted. It focused on three strands of action 
improving information and knowledge for the development of public health, 
responding rapidly to health threats and addressing health determinants. Some 16 
years after Maastricht, Together for Health (Commission of the European 
Communities 2007), which is the basis of the EUs current position, is a broadly 
conceived strategy document, which identifies areas where EU countries cannot act 
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effectively alone and where cooperation at EU level is claimed to add value. Through 
a mixture of position taking, recommendations and encouragement to adopt 
principles, it addresses a comprehensive range of health policy issues including 
public health, health security, improving health systems through best practice in 
workforce planning, patient safety, pharmaceutical assessment, technology 
assessment and e-health issues. The strategy also indicates how the EU is involved 
with risk assessment through a number of associated scientific committees and 
forums that it funds for dialogue and collaboration. The document also records 
positions on taking action against diseases including anti-microbial resistance, 
communicable diseases, vaccinations, major diseases chronic diseases and rare 
diseases. The strategy indicates an intention to exert policy influence over ‘health in 
society’, which means addressing social determinants of health inequalities, ageing, 
healthy environments and screening and genetics. Fostering ‘good health’ signals an 
EU policy role in nutrition and physical activity, alcohol, Tobacco, illicit drugs, mental 
health and sexually transmitted disease. Also of some potential significance is the 
EU promotion of the production and use of health indicators and other data collection 
models. 
 
 
Public health and EU institutions  
 
In attempting to examine how well the EU performs in respect of promoting an 
evidence base in its strategic programme in public health, it is necessary to take full 
cognizance of the complex institutional structure involved. (Greer et al 2014) 
Presented here is a brief summary of the roles played by key institutional actors 
operating within the EU complex.  
 
European Commission  
 
The European Commission, the ‘executive branch’ of the EU, is made up of 
individual Commissioners selected by each member state. The Commission initiates 
all EU legislation. The Commissioners are supported by Directorate Generals – DG’s 
- which are broadly similar to a ministry in a member state. The main health actor is 
DG SANTE (formerly DG SANCO). DG SANTE (Health and Food safety), is 
responsible for health and health systems including public health. There is also a DG 
for Research and Innovation, which exerts a role in relation to bio-medical policy and 
DG Communication Networks, Content and Technology, which is engaged with IT 
and e-health. Of great significance to its potential as a driver for evidence-based 
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public health policy is the extent to which the Commission acts in a collective, 
consensus-based manner. Consensus is formed through discussions and 
agreements between DGs so-called ‘interservice consultation’, between the cabinets 
of the commissioners and through collective consideration by the College of 
Commissioners. The heavy emphasis on consensus-based decision making means 
that impacts on health policy may be of the lowest common denominator variety. This 
is highly significant in how evidence, regardless of its quality, which may not 
guarantee consensus, is treated in the EU complex.  
 
In addition to initiating legislation the commission also influences policy through its 
publication of Communications. A recent example is the Communication – On 
effective, accessible and resilient health systems (European Commission 2014). This 
is a purely exhortative exercise, suggesting how health systems should be organised 
and what they should try and achieve, formulated in what are clearly conceived of as 
broad terms likely to command support across member states.  
 
The European Parliament 
 
Voters in the member states elect the Parliament. Parliament is organised in political 
groupings, which have a rough correspondence with the political parties back home 
in member state parliaments. The Parliament practices a form of decision-making, 
which has a reliance on collaboration and negotiation across the political groups. The 
Parliament is organised through 20 standing committees, which relate to major policy 
areas. In respect of health issues the lead committee is the Environment, Public 
Health and Food Safety Committee, although health research is actually the 
responsibility of another different committee the Industry, Research and Energy 
committee. 
 
The traditional process of legislation also known as ‘co-decision’ begins with a 
Commission proposal. The proposal is considered by Parliament, which may amend 
it in first reading. An amended proposal will subsequently go to the Council of 
Ministers, which in turn may also make amendments in its first reading. If the 
Parliament and Council agree, then legislation will be passed. In the absence of 
agreement legislation will need to go through second readings in both the Parliament 
and Council. If they still cannot agree amendments made to the proposal, then a 
conciliation committee of MEPs and council representatives will try to seek to find a 
compromise that is acceptable to both Parliament and Council. Consensus is made 
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all the more significant in the legislative process, where it should be noted that while 
the Parliament operates on the basis of a majority decision, the arrangement in the 
Council is rather more complex. In some policy area a simple majority is sufficient but 
in others unanimity is required. Evidence may need to be almost incontrovertible 
before legislation would emerge from the EU on public health. 
 
The Council of Ministers  
This is the second legislative body and consists of member state health ministers 
who meet in Council. In total there are 10 policy specific ‘sub-councils’, each 
comprising representatives from the member states. Legislative proposals are taken 
through a majority voting system, although in practice it is normal for the President of 
the Council to seek broad consensus. Public health focused legislation would require 
the agreement of both the Parliament and the Council. The Council and the 
Parliament also produce ‘political statements’, which are not laws, but affirmations of 
priorities. Another unusual feature of the Council is seen in its capacity to issue 
recommendations, which unusually are legal acts with no legal mechanism for 
enforcement by member states. Examples include a recommendation on patient 
safety and health care associated infections and the ‘European Code Against 
Cancer’, a collection of recommended protocols on cancer screening and best 
practices for the prevention and treatment of cancers. Both political statements and 
recommendations are potentially of certain significance in the public health area, 
although actual examples few. In practice the availability of strong evidence that the 
Council can agree on may be elusive.  
The European Council 
 
The European Council consists of heads of government and effects a leadership 
position with respect to the direction of the EU. The European Council may also 
intervene to try and seek solutions to difficult to resolve issues. It has an elected 
President. With reference to illicit drugs, the Horizontal Working Party on Drugs 
(HDG) acts as the coordination body for drug-related issues. HDG develops all 
relevant legislation and political documents adopted by the Council including the EU 
drugs strategies and action plans. Since its creation in 1997 the HDG has been 
focused on drug supply reduction and drug demand reduction. Its role is based on 
coordination, international cooperation, and research, monitoring and evaluation.  
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Agencies  
 
The EU supports a number of agencies, which have a health related  role – the 
European Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (ECDC), the European Food 
Safety Authority (EFSA), the European Medicines Agency (EMA), the European 
Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), the European 
Environment Agency (EEA) and the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work 
(EU-OSHA). Agencies are established by EU regulations and their role is directed to 
specific activities. The dominance of a market logic is often quite apparent in respect 
of the powers exerted by these agencies. For example EFSA and the EMA exert 
highly significant influence through control of access to the markets for relevant 
products. Conversely it seems that in the absence of a clear market logic, there is 
little prospect of agencies with specific rules in relation to vaccination policy or drugs 
misuse policy is being created.  
 
Court of Justice. 
EU law is directly applicable to member states, even if the member state has not 
‘transposed’ acts into domestic legislation. It also has ‘supremacy’ in the sense that it 
overrides member state law. Were public health policy to be translated into a new 
law by the Parliament and European Council, then member states would have no 
option but to fall in line. The consequence of the ‘direct effect’ of EU law is that a 
private individual may enforce a right in EU law against their own state, or any part of 
it, or public body within it, such as national health care bodies. This enforcement 
happens within national courts. This has yet to materialise in respect of law relating 
to health systems. For example there are no significant examples of health policy 
impacting on health systems - the financing, accessibility and delivery of health 
services. Health and safety at work is a different matter with the EU very active in 
enforcement. Once again the dominant market logic is significant, since reaching 
specified health and safety standards is clearly a big factor in production costs and 
requires legal enforcement to provide a level playing field for business across the 
EU. (Hervey 2008) 
New governance and ideational governance 
Looking beyond the ‘hard institutions’ that comprise the EU complex is a form of 
politics that may have certain influence where consensus is a basic requirement for 
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action. (Hervey 2016) The terms ‘new governance’ and ‘ideational governance’ are 
used to describe the influence that is not exercised through organisational or 
legalistic channels. The related term ideational governance is also associated with 
other supranational bodies such as UN and NATO and describes a non-material 
influence of ideas on members, often exercised through networks and forums rather 
than organisational mechanisms - governing without government and ‘soft law’. The 
new governance can be defined  in terms of an increased participation of non-state 
actors, public/private collaboration, adaptability and constant learning and 
coordination. A range of activities are funded around the act of member state policy 
comparison, including benchmarking and extensive sponsorship of experts and 
networks. The EU Health Forum for example is promoted as a means of informing 
and involving key health stakeholders in European health policy. It disseminates 
information, launches ideas for debate and contributes to policy building. It has two 
components: the EU Health Policy Forum (52 non-governmental umbrella 
organisations) and the Open Forum. The Open Forum it is claimed, extends the work 
of the EU Health Policy Forum to a broader set of stakeholders through invitations to 
an annual flagship event, which is supposed to provide a platform for groups and 
organisations which are not normally part of the ‘EU circuit’. The health policy forum 
brings together pan-European stakeholder organisations in the health sector at EU 
level to ensure that the EU’s health strategy is open, transparent and responds to 
public concerns. It advises the Commission (and EU countries if appropriate) on 
health matters. (European Commission 2008) 
 
 
Pandemic Vaccination and the EU  
 
Vaccination represents an established and evidence proven intervention at both an 
individual and population level. It is an effective and unique proactive method for 
protecting the population against infectious diseases and it is estimated that 
immunizations avert close to 6 million deaths annually worldwide. The science 
behind vaccinations is well established. Vaccines are unique in how they are 
administered to a population of healthy, as opposed to diseased individuals to 
prevent rather than treat disease and offer the added benefit of herd immunity over 
other pharmaceuticals. In herd immunity, the chain of transmission of an infectious 
disease is disrupted by immunity of a sufficiently large proportion of a population, 
consequently individuals susceptible to the infectious disease will not get infected. 
The tradeoff is that individuals exposed to vaccines may never derive benefit from 
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exposure if they would not actually have become infected. This is significant since it 
represents a weakness in proving the effectiveness of vaccination on a purely 
individual basis.  From a societal perspective, vaccination benefits include health 
benefits through a decrease in morbidity and mortality and economic benefits 
through a decrease in absence of work and are mediated through direct protection 
and herd immunity. (Lutjiens, Dolk and Marnoch 2011) 
 
A Commission statement from 2009 set out the strategic objectives to be pursued in 
relation to the coping with H1N1 in summary this included the following: 
• Protect the integrity of the healthcare system and the country’s critical 
infrastructure, i.e. maintain essential services;  
• Reduce morbidity and mortality, i.e. protect the vulnerable;  
• Reduce transmission of the pandemic virus within communities, i.e. limit the 
speed of spread of infection and limit the burden on the healthcare system. 
(Commission of the European Communities 2009) 
On a pan-European level, the most important stakeholders in directing the pandemic 
influenza are the European Commission (EC), the European Medicines Agency 
(EMA, formerly EMeA), the ECDC (European Centre for Disease Control and 
Prevention) and committees cooperating with the EMA and ECDC. The EMA plays a 
key role in assessing and recommending authorization of pandemic vaccines for the 
European market.  
 
It is unclear as to whether there were discussions within DG SANCO or elsewhere 
over the alternative interventions that could be used. For example mass-closures of 
public buildings such as schools and colleges. Vaccination was certainly the easiest 
intervention to pursue in political terms but even such a well-established intervention 
is not without controversy and as an intervention carrying potential benefits and risks 
it can be the subject of complex decision-making processes.  
 
On 24 March 2009, an outbreak of novel H1N1 influenza A or swine flu, was 
identified in Mexico. The new virus quickly spread and on the 11th  June 2009, the 
World Health Organization (WHO) raised the pandemic level to 6, indicating the first 
widespread influenza pandemic since the 1968 H3N2 Hong Kong flu. In line with an 
established protocol for action, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control (ECDC) and the WHO publicised clinical and pharmacological advisory 
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management guidelines for managing this pandemic. However European national 
authorities were responsible for developing national vaccination policies, which is 
perhaps surprising given the nature of the pandemic and it’s possible consequences 
for health.  
 
Pandemic vaccinations and the evidence problem  
 
In examining the response of member states to the H1N1 pandemic it is a relatively 
simple to examine data describing basic vaccination rates across the member states 
in the EU. This data refers to populations whose exposure to similar vaccines has 
been subject to large-scale clinical trials. This represents the part of the pandemic 
vaccination policy most easily based on highest quality of evidence. The record of 
member states having acted on evidence based EU recommendations is very hard to 
discern from the data. Out of the 27 member states 24 reported implementing 
pandemic vaccination programmes, Latvia and Poland had no programme and 
Bulgaria did not enact its programme because it’s supply of vaccine was not 
available until after the pandemic subsided. Some eight different vaccines were 
used, rather than just the three centrally authorised by the European Commission. 
The record is all the more uneven when vaccination target groups are examined. 
Twelve countries recommended vaccine for individuals of all ages, six countries had 
recommendations for varying age groups in children with three countries 
recommending pandemic vaccine to varying adult age groups. All 27 countries did 
recommend that health care workers be offered vaccine, with 16 countries 
recommending vaccine to all health care workers and 11 to selected categories. 
Vaccine was recommended for some other occupational categories such as the 
police in 12 countries.   
 
Of the 24 countries with pandemic vaccination programmes, only two thirds of the 
countries had commenced their programmes by week 44 (end of week 1 November 
2009), with a long ‘tail’ with some countries not able to start until near the end of 
2009 due to capacity issues. The actual vaccination rates achieved varied 
considerably. Out of the 22 countries able to provide population-wide data on 
pandemic influenza vaccination, the coverage ranged from  0.4% to 59%. The 
highest reported population vaccination coverage was reached in the Netherlands 
and the Nordic countries - range 30% to 59%. Vaccination rates for health care 
workers were collected in 13 countries showing a range of 3% to 68%,  with the 
highest coverage reported in the Netherlands, Romania and Hungary - range 50% to 
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68%). 
 
Aside from the notably differing resource capacities to implement a vaccination 
programme of countries such as Bulgaria, Latvia and Poland in comparison with the 
rich northern European countries, there are political and societal factors, which 
explain differences in response to the vaccination advice issued by the EU. The 
VENICE group reported that countries were influenced by public perception factors 
that impacted negatively on vaccination rates. (VENICE 2012) Concerns about 
vaccine safety varied, as did belief in the value of vaccination. Particular fears were 
noted in half or more countries concerning the presence of thiomersal, adjuvants in 
the vaccine and the accelerated licensing process for the H1N1 vaccine.  Vaccines 
containing the mercury-based preservative thiomersal were linked to the 
development of autism and other brain development disorders in a fraudulent 
research article published in 1998. An adjuvant is an ingredient of a vaccine that 
helps create a stronger immune response in the patient’s body. Some vaccines 
made from weakened or dead germs contain naturally occurring adjuvants but most 
recent vaccines include just small components of germs, rather than the entire virus 
or bacteria. These vaccines use added adjuvants to ensure the body produces a 
good immune response.  There are no grounds based on accepted research 
evidence to believe that adjuvants are dangerous, but as with thiomersal there are 
public fears over safety. In one member state, the Czech republic there had been an 
earlier vaccine contamination incident, which appears to have influenced the impact 
of the programme.  
 
The data discussed above refers to groups whose exposure to vaccines has been 
the subject of extensive clinical trials. When detailed attention is paid to the 
vaccination of pregnant women an even less impressive record of EU influence 
emerges. The ECDC, following the advice given by WHO, recognized from the 
evidence of past epidemics and in seasonal influenza that pregnant women were 
along with people with chronic diseases and young children at high risk for 
complications from influenza.  Vaccination of the pregnant woman would also protect 
the fetus, who could not be vaccinated. Illustrating the difficulty in finding 
incontrovertible evidence, the most recent pre-pandemic seasonal influenza 
vaccination advice issued by the ECDC had concluded that there is no consensus 
over whether pregnant women should be considered a risk group for (seasonal) 
influenza and “data are insufficient” for pregnant women to be considered a risk 
group at the EU level. (Nicoll 2008)  
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There is also to be considered the long-standing reluctance to involve pregnant 
women in clinical trials due to fears of damage to the developing fetus. Consequently 
pregnant women are likely to find it harder to access thoroughly tested and approved 
medication including vaccinations. Similar to seasonal influenza (Nicoll 2008), the 
pandemic influenza vaccination decision-making process has been impaired by 
limited evidence, which was subject to multiple interpretations. Pregnancy is a unique 
group compared to other population groups in the sense it is a dynamic group that 
undergoes a number of phases. Each of the trimesters of pregnancy is subject to 
individual considerations with respect to vaccination of pregnancy. A study by 
Lutjiens, Dolk and Marnoch (2011) based on responses from 20 countries found all 
had a policy of targeting pregnant women. For two of the four countries without 
official pandemic vaccination policies, some vaccination of pregnant women took 
place. In 12 out of 20 countries the policy was to vaccinate only second and third 
trimester pregnant women and in 8 out of 20 countries the policy was to vaccinate 
pregnant women regardless of trimester of pregnancy. Seven different vaccines were 
used for pregnant women, of which four contained adjuvants. Surprisingly given the 
nature of the issue, few countries had mechanisms to monitor the number of 
vaccinations given specifically to pregnant women over time. Vaccination uptake 
varied and as with the other population groups targeted differences in pandemic 
vaccination policy and practice might relate to variation in perception of vaccine 
efficacy and safety, operational issues related to vaccine manufacturing and 
procurement, and vaccination campaign systems. Comparing the Netherlands and 
the UK and their decisions on vaccinating pregnant women reveals the extent to 
which judgments about evidence were having to be made. As the pandemic spread, 
in September 2009 the Dutch revised their pandemic vaccination policy to include 
vaccination of 2nd and 3rd trimester healthy pregnant women, indicating that 
vaccination decisions had to be made with limited evidence initially as the risks to 
healthy pregnant women had been considered insufficient to warrant vaccination. In 
the UK, a country with a similar capacity to examine the same evidence, healthy 
pregnant women were considered to be at risk from the start of the pandemic 
outbreak. 
 
Illicit Drug Misuse and the EU  
 
In recent decades, the overall level of illicit drug use in Europe has grown rapidly. In 
the 21st century, the share of premature or avoidable mortality among young adults 
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that can be attributed to illicit drug overdose, accounts for an estimated 4% of deaths 
among those aged aged 15-39 in Europe. Deaths are often related to drug injecting 
and in most cases, involve a combination of substances. The number of problem 
opioid users in Europe is cautiously estimated by the ECMDDA (2011) at about 1.3 
million. It is the opioid user population who are at most risk in terms of mortality 
related to illicit drug use. Such high levels of mortality among drug users has become 
a major policy issue for countries within the EU and in the late 1980s the European 
Parliament launched two investigatory commissions to examine different approaches 
towards illicit drugs, with a view to establishing a European policy. The results of both 
commissions made insufficient impact in the sense of establishing a common framing 
of the problem which remained a source of dispute between member states.  In 
acknowledgement of the range of differing views on how to tackle illicit drugs, the 
principle of subsidiarity was invoked, meaning member states were at will to pursue 
their own policies. The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction 
(EMCDDA) had already been set up in 1995, signifying the issue of illicit drug use 
was receiving EU attention. The first European Drugs strategy was agreed in 2000 
(Chatwin 2012). In subsequent decades the issue has received a great deal of 
support from within the EU complex, but with little to show in terms of harmonization 
of policies across European member states. Differences in policy are still marked. 
Some countries treat drug users as ‘diseased’ and in need of help or in ‘experimental 
phases’ of their life and have consequently adopted a liberal approach, reflected in 
the minimising of contact with the criminal justice system experienced by users.  At 
the other end of the spectrum there are countries which have adopted much harder 
approaches to drug use with an emphasis on the criminalisation of addicts. Chatwin 
(2011) draws attention to the difficulties in interpreting the impact of differing 
approaches to drug misuse in Europe. The cases of Sweden and the Netherlands 
are highly instructive in identifying why the EU has made little headway in promoting 
a common approach. In two countries that are in many ways very similar in terms of 
wealth, culture and values we find major divergences at every level. Chatwin 
describes Swedish drug policy as moralistic, aiming to eradicate rather than 
ameliorate impacts. The Dutch on the other hand pursue a policy that is more 
pragmatic and based on the concept of harm reduction. There appear to be 
consequences, Sweden has low rates of drug use but drug related deaths are three 
times the European average. In the Netherlands drug use is slightly above the 
average but the number of related deaths is low. There are grounds for arguing that 
the fairly extreme positions adopted by member states are not acceptable given the 
evidence that is available on the problem. Since the 1990s evidence has been 
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accumulated to support the conclusion that drug misuse treatment is effective in 
terms of reduced substance use; improvements in personal health and social 
functioning; and reduced public health and safety risks. However, the data collected 
is not always easy to use in the type of comparative research that might provide an 
evidence base for harmonization. Even a basic concept such as ‘drug related death’ 
may cause problems when different classifications used by member states become 
apparent.  Drug treatments are difficult to conceptualise on a standardised basis. 
Interventions consist of specific change techniques, some of which directly address 
drug use, such as drug testing, drug counselling, and relapse prevention training, 
while others are directed at other problems, such as social skills training, family 
therapy or primary medical care. By contrast a vaccination is relatively easy to 
measure according to recognised standards. Some treatments have been 
extensively studied for their effectiveness, whereas others have received only limited 
attention. In all cases though context will vary considerably. There are often 
substantial differences in the nature of patients treated, while country specific 
capacities to offer treatments, their structures for intervention and the actual delivery 
methods render comparisons more or less worthless. Chatwin concludes there are 
no obvious relationships between the nature of drug policy and the size and nature of 
the drug problem.  
 
Illicit drugs use and the evidence problem  
 
A commitment to offering evidence-based treatment is a commendable aspiration 
and has obvious benefits in Europe, but in the absence of research evidence, 
decisions about the provision of treatment must be made according to criteria other 
than those of empirical research. The EU needs to confront specific problems 
encountered with collecting high quality evidence in this difficult area and the current 
European Drugs Strategy recognises the task involved in building policies on 
empirical evidence. (EMCDDA 2016) A UN (2002) review of the evidence base for 
drug abuse treatment discussed the research tools available including random 
controlled trials and uncontrolled observational evaluations (before and after studies) 
but also many far less robust methods. The differences in the quality of research not 
withstanding, the UN concluded that there is strong evidence to show that both the 
detoxification-stabilization and rehabilitation-relapse prevention treatments are able 
to meet their stated goals and objectives and confer important benefits on patients, 
their families and the wider community and society. Tellingly this conclusion 
acknowledges that treatments benefits are framed in terms associated with that 
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specific intervention and can rarely be examined in the type of cost-benefit 
comparison with other treatments that might be likely to cause member state 
governments to adopt consistent treatment programmes. Decontextualizing 
treatments seems very difficult on the basis of the research tools employed. Illicit 
drug consumption habits are often very different even within one country. The 
differing criminal justice systems impact on the problem in a variety of ways. The 
availability of particular drugs and associated harm and crime effects will constantly 
change.  The problem with evidence and policy also becomes markedly more 
complex when the problem is framed in a ‘holistic’ rather medical mode. There are no 
universal excepted criteria for success. For example what respective weight should 
be attached to reductions in individual user harm, deaths, associated criminal 
activities and nuisance when evaluating treatments? So-called controversial 
initiatives such as rooms where users can safely consume drugs and the official 
provision of heroin to users have very little pan- EU acceptance. The EU is designed 
to achieve compromises but in this policy area any common ground of significance 
seems to be elusive.  
 
Evidence and institutions an appraisal.  
 
Table 1 sets out general observations that can be made regarding the evidence 
relating to policy problems associated with pandemic vaccinations and responses to 
illicit drugs use. In spite of the difficulties noted in relation to pregnant women, it is 
nevertheless true that with the use of extensive high clinical trials and reference to 
historical data relating to vaccination make for a relatively high potential value. There 
are plenty of indications nevertheless that the EU could do far more to increase the 
scope and reliability of data collection in relation to pandemic vaccination. There is a 
big variation in the condition of data collected by member states and consequently 
‘medium’ seems a fair classification. It is pertinent to ask whether a federal EU on the 
could organise a far more systematic data collection system, such as that available in 
the United States, where amongst other mechanisms, well-developed survey 
research is used. (CDCP 2013) In the event, the data discussed in this paper 
demonstrates a low actual use of evidence at the EU level. Member states were 
selective in their reference to evidence in formulating responses, as reflected in their 
heterogeneous vaccination response. Expert consensus on vaccinations and their 
efficacy and safety in use against pandemics is very high. Societal consensus on 
vaccination is fairly strong (medium), although scandals and scares have added a 
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greater fragility to the acceptance of vaccination and its benefits in certain countries. 
It could be argued that the wide social and cultural diversity found within the EU 
militates against imposing a common vaccination strategy on member states. 
Pandemics are episodic in character and the timeframe involved in responding to a 
pandemic vaccine is short. This undoubtedly also makes the assessment of evidence 
a less than fully rational exercise. Assumptions and shortcuts had to be made in 
2009. The capacity of member states to act on evidence has been shown to be 
highly variable. In practice it is difficult to attribute coverage rates to opposition or 
lack of capacity and it is likely a mixture of both have influenced outcomes. 
 
Table 1. Evidence and policy  
 
 Pandemic vaccination 
(H1N1) 
Illicit drugs use 
Potential opportunity and 
actual use (brackets) of 
evidence in policy 
medium (low) low (low) 
Condition of evidence medium  low 
Societal consensus on 
evidence in member 
states 
medium  low 
Expert consensus on 
evidence 
high  medium 
Timeframe for policy short long 
Member state capacity to 
act on evidence 
varied  varied 
 
Illicit drugs present a different type of evidence problem in many respects. The 
potential to base policy on evidence is constrained by the lack of conceptual clarity 
related to, for example, definitions of both harm and criminal/nuisance effects. The 
quality of data collected reflects the fact that illicit drugs consumption is both illegal 
and stigmatized making it hard to accurately record behavioural patterns if there is a 
reliance on self-reporting. There is little agreement on the framing of policy issues. A 
long spectrum exists between the ‘eradicators’ and the ‘pragmatics’, with countries 
displaying various degrees of acceptance in between these positions depending on 
the exact issue. Politicians tend to aware of their need to reflect public opinion rather 
than lead on the issue of illicit drugs use. In these political and social circumstances 
there is low potential opportunity identified for the use of evidence based policy. The 
actual use is also low, with certain exceptions. The condition of evidence it is 
acknowledged needs to improve considerably, it is currently poor. The sheer range of 
treatments and other actions that are used undermines expert consensus on actions 
in relation to illicit drug misuse. Research methods are also numerous and lacking in 
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standardization. Consensus is accordingly rather less observable when compared to 
pandemic vaccination. Societal consensus even within one country is frequently 
difficult to pin down and should be classified as low when compared to the medium 
levels of agreement secured around vaccination. The timeframe for illicit drugs policy 
is long term. The problem has been around in various manifestations for a long time 
and shows no sign of disappearing. Member state capacity to act on evidence is very 
varied, which is partly a consequence of where a country sits on the eradication-
pragmatism spectrum. Some countries have a capacity to offer some or all of the 
treatments used to engage with addiction, others would have very limited resources 
to offer anything. While, in the light of public fears over HIV, new member states are 
compelled to agree to offer needle exchange programmes and methadone 
substitution initiatives, their actual ability to comply can be questioned.  Once again 
the problem of collecting reliable data makes compliance difficult to guarantee.  
 
Table 2. EU power potential and actual (brackets) 
 
 Pandemic vaccination 
(H1N1) 
Illicit drugs use 
Legislation low (none) low (none) 
Market regulation  low (low) none (none) 
Agencies medium (medium) low (low) 
New governance high (low) high (low) 
Performance metrics high (low) high (low) 
 
 
Table 2 appraises the potential and actual impact of EU institutions to add value to 
pandemic vaccination and action on illicit drugs use. Legislative action seems highly 
unlikely in either area policy area examined now or in the immediate future. When 
the European Parliament and European Council agree then legislation is passed but 
policy evidence would have to be implausibly strong and compelling before 
legislation would emerge from the EU on public health. Market regulation is at the 
heart of the EU complex. The comparison between alcohol and tobacco is frequently 
cited as an indication of how market logic dominates policy. The EU will actively 
influence tobacco pricing on public health grounds but not alcohol, the reason being 
that members states are heavily involved in alcohol production but not at all in 
tobacco.  It is conceivable that pandemic vaccination policy could be significantly 
influenced by rules relating to the manufacture of drugs, but this would be confined to 
specifications and licensing rather than coverage related harmonization, so 
legislative action potential has low potential. The record of vaccination use in the 
H1N1 pandemic suggests influence is low. Illicit drugs are by definition not part of the 
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market system regulated by the EU.  It is difficult to even guess at how the EU could 
exert influence on the use of evidence-based policies in this area, so the potential for 
legislative action should be classified as ‘none’.  EU agencies are of much greater 
potential influence in the promotion of harmonized evidence based policy. Agencies 
are awarded considerable power in certain areas but always on the basis of a tightly 
constrained remit. In the field of health and safety at work EU-OSHA has a strong 
record. Contrastingly in the absence of a legislation-backed role to enforce evidence-
based policies, in the two cases under examination, exhortation, best practice guides 
are relied on, with seemingly weak impacts to date. The two principle agencies in the 
cases examined are the EMCDDA (illicit drugs) and the ECDC (vaccines) and their 
central positions at the heart of expert communities in Europe are potentially of great 
significance to the promotion of evidence passed policies, but advice they might 
provide is not translated into harmonization actions by the Commission. The ECDC 
can also be seen as a regional coordinating post, which linked with the WHO during 
the pandemic. In the case of pandemic vaccination, the H1N1 case demonstrated 
little impact beyond that fulfilled through a data collection and advisory role. The 
ECDC has demonstrated some success in promoting an evidence based approach 
to pandemics but could be only classed as a medium strength power of influence. 
The EMCDDA like the ECDC is in a strong position in a research network but must 
respect subsidiarity in a controversial policy area, where national differences are 
pronounced. It’s power is consequently low in respect of promoting evidence based 
policy.  
 
New governance or ideational governance is an important part of the contemporary 
EU complex. In both the case of pandemic vaccination and illicit drugs policy, the 
potential impact seems high given the commitment evident in the research 
communities to promoting best practices in respect of very serious public health 
problems. A question needs to be asked about the specific role played by the EU. Is 
it performing a pivotal role in the furtherance of research as implied by its 
sponsorship of numerous research and policy forums or alternately does it exploit 
work, which would be taking place anyway? Convincing researchers and other 
members of policy networks that evidence policies are desirable does not require the 
same political commitment as member state compliance with evidence. The current 
impact of new governance is disappointingly low in the two public health policy cases 
examined. New member states for example signed up to evidence supported policies 
on needles and methadone because this was part of the deal which gave them 
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membership. Providing a platform for experts to influence policy is a very passive 
and to date ineffective means of establishing evidence based policies in the EU.  
 
Slightly more traditional in their intended mechanisms of influence than the discursive 
practices associated with EU sponsored forums, are the performance metrics 
systems being promoted as part of public health and drugs strategies. Performance 
metrics relating to aspects of vaccine coverage or drug addiction treatments may be 
potentially of high influence if they are used to regulate funding to member states or 
as part of a ‘shaming scheme’ which highlights poor performers. As yet this has not 
been realised and the impact appears low in the sense of influencing member states 
to comply with evidence based policy.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The paper has examined the ‘reach of Europeanization’, in the promoting of evidence 
based public health policies. In choosing policy areas where the use of evidence is 
affected by markedly different sets of problems and opportunities, the intention was 
to expose the strengths and weaknesses of the institutions of the EU. Existing EU 
institutions are clearly compromised in the extent to which they can promote 
evidence-based approaches to health policy on the part of member states. This is a 
discouraging finding given that institutions and the use of evidence in policy are 
inextricably linked. Evidence will rarely win a decision on its own, usually a certain 
level of institutional support is required. In the cases examined factors such as the 
condition of evidence and the varying levels of societal and expert consensus mean 
that considerable challenges face institutional promoters of evidence based policies. 
It is by no means clear that the EU complex is developing the means to establish 
evidence based public health. Institutional complexity, which is all too apparent when 
specific policy cases are examined, undermines the inherent power of well-
researched evidence applied to complex policy issues.  
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